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AT a recent meeting of the New York State Bar Association
complaint was made of "an already existing and still growing
evil, the great bulk and consequent increasing uncertainty of the
law." The existence of the evil will n6t be disputed but the
remedy is neither easy of suggestion nor of application. At the
meeting mentioned above it was proposed that general rules
concerning the writing and publication of judicial opinions
should be adopted by judges of the Appellate Courts. This sug-
gestion if acted upon would seem to lead to valuable and practi-
cal results, but to the further remedial suggestions offered at
the same meeting some objections may be presented. It was
proposed to restrict the verbosity of judicial decisions in general
and to prevent entirely the delivery of opinions by the court in
those cases which involve merely the application of well settled
principles of law. Were this as easily accomplished as proposed
the practice would still seem to be of doubtful value. The duty
of courts of law is primarily to settle disputes and to settle them
justly, but a further and by no means unimportant duty is to
make such settlements as satisfactory as possible to all parties
concerned. The defeated litigant can never perhaps be thor-
oughly convinced of his error, yet a dismissal of his cause with
simply the citation of a decision of which he is probably already
cognizant would do little but increase his dissatisfaction with the
results of his suit, while questioning the integrity of his lawyer
who haa failed to see the application of a case when, in the
opinion of the court, its application was so obvious as to require
no comment.
But apart from this view of the subject it would seem that in
most cases the application of previous decisions would not be so
clear as to make comment and explanation unnecessary. The
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principle may be clear and easy of expression, yet its applica-
tion may be most difficult and involved; the decision of a stated
case may be most definite and yet an interpretation of the law
therein contained may well tax the ingenuity of even judicial
minds. In such cases the litigant parties are entitled to hear
the reasons which led the court to adopt its view of the applica-
tion of the law and as most cases involve such application and
interpretation the proposed change if suitably modified would
lose much if not all of its significance.
It was further proposed at the same meeting that opinions
should be handed down as the opinions of the court as such, and
not as the works of individual judges. It is claimed that this
plan if adopted would shorten the opinions, would place respon-
sibility upon all the judges, and would provide against dissent-
ing opinions. This suggestion would seem to make doubtful
the attainment of the promised result and at the same time to be
open to the gravest objections. Opinions in their new capacity
would embody the reasoning of all the judges instead of merely
the one who under the present system is its author, while the
conclusion would be reached through various and varying pro-
cesses, according to the disagreement of the judges as to the
proper grounds upon which to base their decision. The decision
would be the decision of the court, the reasoning would be a pot-
pourri of legal applications and interpretations, terminating it is
true, in one common conclusion, but wanting in the two requi-
site virtues of brevity and clearness, the attainment of which was
the very object in view. Farther than this the weakening of
individual responsibility for the doubtful strength of a court act-
ing as a whole is also a matter for question. The author of an
opinion is individually responsible for the law therein contained,
but under the proposed system this responsibility would be
abolished. Dissenting opinions, which now serve to place the
minority judges in a true light and which have often materially
aided in the logical growth of the law, would, under the new sys-
tem, totally disappear, and a bare majority of the court would
have even a greater influence than is now their privilege.
Finally, the loss of valuable opinions and the loss of the
authority of the authors' names would seem to negative any
benefits which might be derived from the above suggestions.
The law as we have it to-day is often found best interpreted in
the opinions of our judges and the weight and authority of the
opinions are often enhanced by the eminence and reputation of
their authors. If this source of legal literature is cut off the sci-
ence and the art of law will be left with only text books and
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magazine articles, while these, especially in this country, are only
too often mere digests of the law without even suggestions as
to causes and effects. The evil of verbose and prolix judicial
opinions may be a crying one, but its remedy would seem to lie
more in individual discretion than in such radical action as pro-
posed.
REFERENCa to arbitration in all disputes of whatever nature
will not become possible nor indeed will the principle itself be
seriously entertained or relied upon by nations until, either by
changes supplementing the rules of international law at present
existing, or by treaty, the rules of law are developed so as to
render the rights of parties under given conditions capable of
being clearly ascertained, and the remedies to be applied certain
and such as under all the circumstances will work substantial
justice between the governments concerned. In controversies
concerning land some period of limitation ought to be fixed upon
whereby the adverse possession of territory for a certain length
of time should be deemed conclusive evidence as to title, thus
placing territorial disputes between nations in a position to be
dealt with upon a basis analogous to that upon which private
titles to real estate are now adjusted. It is unreasonable to
demand or expect that an independent state will consent to
refer questions affecting the rights and citizenship of its own sub-
jects, who have been for many years in peaceable possession of a
tract of territory in good faith believing they had a right to
occupy it, to any tribunal, however eminent, whose decision
might be conclusively determined by the contents of some docu-
ument exhumed from among the refuse of former centuries.
The Venezuela Boundary Treaty was of course designed to fit a
particular instance and its provisions will have no weight in
another case except possibly the authority of precedents. The
reported stipulation, however, that exclusive political control of
a district for fifty years as well as the actual settlement thereof
shall be sufficient to make title by prescription is, under the cir-
cumstances, an exceedingly fair and equitable settlement of an
otherwise difficult point, and deserves to be acquiesced in and fol-
lowed by other nations in cases which may arise in future. The
interests of society demand that a period be fixed upon after
which no evidence of adverse title will be heard. It will be then
possible to submit territorial claims to arbitration, knowing that
the decision is to be based upon the fact of settlement and actual
occupancy and not upon the theoretical interpretation of uncer-
tain documents from the past. In these days of bitter commer-
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cial competition between states, and headlong eagerness to
embark upon "land grabbing" schemes without pretense of
right or shadow of excuse, the rules of law must be definite and
the remedy certain and reasonable if arbitration treaties are to
be of any avail in averting the ultimate appeal to force.
THE arbitration treaty, which has been signed by the diplo-
matic agents of the United States and Great Britain, if newspaper
reports are correct, expresses the desire to consolidate the rela-
tions of international amity now existing between the two coun-
tries and to provide for the perpetuation of these relations in the
future. This is not an attempt to establish a permanent inter-
national court but to provide for the establishment of special
courts as the need for them is felt. In brief, the treaty provides
for the peaceable settlement of those questions which would
naturally seem to be capable of peaceable settlement without
such a treaty, and interposes a barrier which, if unbroken, will
serve to delay an immediate recourse to arms in those cases
where a peaceable settlement is not possible. The courts cre-
ated under this treaty, when deciding non-territorial claims, will
consist of one neutral judge, assisted by quasi-judges whose
chief duties, however, will be to represent the interests of their
respective countries by whom they will be appointed, while ter-
ritorial questions will come before a court composed entirely of
quasi-judges of the above description. War is still recognized
to be the supreme arbitrator in certain cases, although in those
cases where it is not so recognized there would be little reason
to fear it even under the present system. By the treaty there is
an official establishment of a peace which is already established,
an official postponement of a war which in all probability could
not be definitely postponed should its causes arise.
Whether or not international intercourse has sufficiently
developed to insure the success of such a treaty is a matter for
the future to- prove. In the meantime, however, and at the
present time, it seems as if our efforts should be directed
towards the development of trade and commerce between
nations instead of merely endeavoring to find new expressions
for a peace which by our evident apprehension we show to be of
doubtful stability and of an illusionary and uncertain character.
International unions, it may be said, will only then be placed
upon a safe ground when they are based upon economic condi-
tions which demand and sanction them and not alone upon the
perhaps more attractive but less practical ground of peace and
good will. The influence of the arbitration treaty for good has
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perhaps in the main been already accomplished in furnishing
evidence, which indeed should not be despised, of an apparent de-
sire on the part of the two governments for peace; its influ-
ence for evil is unknown and can only be foreshadowed by
the different motives which have been attributed to its
creation, the balancing of international accounts which it
seems to have caused, and its possibly detrimental effect upon
diplomacy. Indeed, during this exchange of courtesies the two
countries seem to be strictly adhering to the old adage, "In time
of peace prepare for war," and those who are skeptical as re-
gards universal and perpetual peace under existing conditions
are found to be indulging in the thought that "mere names do
not alter facts and no amount of legislation can make a reality
out of a fiction." The value of the treaty would certainly seem to
be sentimental rather than practical and it only remains for us to
hope in regard to it that sentiment may play a more important
part in international affairs in the future than it has in the past.
On the other hand, the treaty is certainly evidence of the
friendly relations now existing between the two countries and
expresses the desire that these relations may continue. It may
be that the objections urged against it are more technical than
real, however well they may seem to be founded on reason and
history. The main object is the prevention of war and possibly
the delay for which this treaty provides will have a salutary
effect upon the minds of the people should the peace now pre-
vailing be ever endangered. The same object, however, might
perhaps be attained and with less cause for objection by the
mere adoption of a resolution recently offered in the Senate
which declares that "the United States favor the principle and
practice of international arbitration for the settlement of all
questions in difference between them and any other nation,
which they may fail to adjust by treaty or diplomatic negotia-
tions,'" and invites "all civilized nations to make a correspond-
ing and reciprocal declaration to the end that wars between
nations may cease and that a universal reign of peace may be
inauggrated and perpetually maintained." The practicability
of adopting this resolution instead of ratifying the pending
treaty of arbitration is a matter for the Senate to decide, but it
seems as if such action might be safer and easier and perhaps as
efficient as an adoption of the more elaborate and pretentious
plan under discussion. The final sanction, other than war, of all
international contracts or quasi contracts, whether they take the
shape of treaties or resolutions, must be national integrity and
honor, and as the main object is an avoidance of war so long as
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it is avoided honorably, it seems as though a resolution, all
things considered, might be as salutary in its results as a treaty,
although it may be thought that a treaty would appeal more
strongly to the sense of national honor than a mere resolution.
There can be no difference of opinion as to the end in view; it
is only the means which are debatable, and those means should
be chosen which will afford the greatest efficiency with the least
danger and complexity.
THE frequent attempts to set aside wills upon the ground of
undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity, emphasize the
importance of the passage of a bill which has been proposed in
Connecticut. The bill provides that a person may deposit his
sealed will in the Probate Court, whereupon notice of such
deposit shall be published, and any one desiring to contest
the will upon the ground of a lack of testamentary capacity
or undue influence must do so before the death of the maker
of the will. The advantages of such a law are obvious. Under
the present practice appeals from probate are necessarily pro-
tracted, and in the majority of cases the appellant -does not
improve his condition. Other cases on the docket are delayed for
weeks and often for months. The dead man is abused by foe
and kin, and the details of his entire life are related, with par-
ticular emphasis upon his eccentricities and misdeeds, and are
published throughout the community. The public, who
have heretofore regarded the man with the highest respect, are
asked to heap abuse upon his head. Family secrets are disin-
terred and the surviving members of the family blush with
shame. The testator cannot speak and explain his conduct, so
his nearest relatives, who oftentimes have been his worst ene-
mies, try to set aside the last formal declaration in which he has
provided for those who were his true friends. Under the pro-
posed law these contests would largely disappear. Unfriendly
relatives would seldom attempt to establish a lack of testamen-
tary capacity, and the temptation to use undue influence upon
weak-minded men would be lessened. Should contests arise,
they would be decided promptly and the great expense inci-
dent to the present practice would cease. That such a
law would be approved by the courts seems certain; that it
would be welcomed by the bar is apparent to those who realize
that a lawyer has other duties than fighting cases for the pur-
pose of consuming large estates; that it would command public
sanction can scarcely be doubted. It is to be hoped that the
Legislature will pass the bill.
